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Sometimes, when I recommend that people read Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations (the full title is An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations), I am met with a supercilious snort, as if nothing that was written 
in 1776 could be relevant to today. A very common attitude seems to be, "That 
is sooo 18th-century." I think what it really shows is that the "snorter" 
has simply not read Adam Smith. Smith's book is chock-full of insights: that 
when competitors get together they often collude; that governments can't 
stop such collusion but should refrain from facilitating it; that countries 
with private property, free trade, and low taxes are the ones that do 
well; that the incentives of universities are so messed up (yes, even back 
then) that much less learning takes place than could; and, of more 
immediate interest, that imperialism doesn't work.
You read it right. Adam Smith was one of the most outspoken, clear-thinking, 
and well-reasoning spokesman against imperialism in the 18th century. One 
particular imperialist this Scotsman took on was Britain, and one particular 
instance was Britain's trying to hold on to the 13 colonies. Smith didn't chant 
some 18th-century version of "No blood for oil." Instead, he calmly and 
numerately toted up the costs of imperialism to the British people, estimated 
the benefits to Britain, and concluded that the costs greatly exceeded the 
benefits.
The benefits, in Smith's estimate, were the monopoly profits that British 
merchants had on sales to consumers in the colonies. The costs that Britons 
bore were the costs of using the military to defend that monopoly. Here's an 
excerpt from Smith:
"The maintenance of this monopoly [on trade with the American colonies] 
has hitherto been the principal, or more properly perhaps the sole end 
and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain assumes over her 
colonies. … The Spanish war, which began in 1739, was principally a 
colony quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent the search of the colony 
ships which carried 
on a contraband trade with the Spanish Main. This whole expence is, in 
reality, a bounty which has been given in order to support a monopoly. The 
pretended purpose of it was to encourage the manufactures, and to increase 
the commerce of Great Britain. But its real effect has been to raise the rate of 
mercantile profit. … Under the present system of management, therefore, 
Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes 
over her colonies." 1
Later, Smith elaborated, showing that the costs to the British government of 
defending the 13 colonies were greater than the benefits to the British. He 
wrote:
"A great empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a 
nation of customers who should be obliged to buy from the shops of our 
different producers all the goods with which these could supply them. For the 
sake of that little enhancement of price which this monopoly might afford our 
producers, the home-consumers have been burdened with the whole expence 
of maintaining and defending that empire. For this purpose, and for this 
purpose only … a new debt of more than a hundred and seventy millions has 
been contracted over and above all that had been expended for the same 
purpose in former wars. The interest of this debt alone is not only greater 
than the whole extraordinary profit which it ever could be pretended was 
made by the monopoly of the colony trade, but than the whole value of that 
trade…." 2
That's not all. Smith pointed out that the costs and benefits of maintaining the 
colonies were not symmetrically distributed and that this accounted for why 
the British wouldn't give up their colonies voluntarily. Consider this justly 
famous passage.
"To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of 
customers may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of 
shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of 
shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced 
by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of 
fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and 
treasure of their fellow-citizens to found and maintain such an empire. Say to 
a shopkeeper, 'Buy me a good estate, and I shall always buy my clothes at 
your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer than what I can have 
them for at other shops'; and you will not find him very forward to embrace 
your proposal. But should any other person buy you such an estate, the 
shopkeeper would be much obliged to your benefactor if he would enjoin 
you to buy all your clothes at his shop." 3
In other words, Smith is saying, the costs of maintaining colonies in order to 
maintain a preferential trade arrangement exceeded the benefits – thus his 
statement that the project is unfit for a nation of shopkeepers. But the cost to 
the shopkeepers is a small fraction of the cost to Britain – they pay only their 
pro rata share – whereas the shopkeepers get the lion's share of the benefits. If 
the shopkeepers had to bear the whole cost of the arrangement, the benefits 
would not be worth it. Thus his analogy to the sucker deal that someone 
hypothetically offers a shopkeeper: buy me a house and I'll promise to buy all 
my goods from you from now on. The shopkeeper would quickly reject such 
a deal. But if the shopkeeper can find others to pay for the house and he pays 
only a fraction, the deal might be in the shopkeeper's interest. Using the 
asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits to explain why governments 
take actions that are not in the general interest – whether the special interest 
benefited be farmers, seniors, or Northrop Grumman – has become part of the 
tool kit of the modern economist, due to the "public choice" revolution started 
by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. But notice that Smith had the idea 
two centuries earlier.
Smith believed the British government would try to hang on to colonies by 
force. Smith wrote:
"To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over 
her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact their own 
laws, and to make peace and war as they might think proper, would be to 
propose such a measure as never was, and never will be adopted, by any 
nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any 
province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, and how small 
soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to the expence 
which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might frequently be 
agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the pride of every nation, 
and what is perhaps of still greater consequence, they are always contrary to 
the private interest of the governing part of it…." 4
Smith even predicted the Revolutionary War and implicitly predicted its 
outcome. He wrote:
"[I]t is not very probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us; and we 
ought to consider that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so 
is, every drop of it, blood either of those who are, or of those whom we wish 
to have for our fellow-citizens. They are very weak who flatter themselves 
that, in the state to which things have come, our colonies will be easily 
conquered by force alone." 5
Wise words from a wise man.
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